SERVICE OF PROCESS ON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS:
NORTH CAROLINA ADOPTS A RESTRICTIVE
INTERPRETATION
JURISDICTION

of state courts over foreign corporations has for years

been the subject of extensive litigation.'

While the question ultimately

involves the satisfaction of due process requirements of the fourteenth
amendment, 2 the decisions evince a variety of conflicting views as to
what this satisfaction entails.
Judicial application of the traditional concept of service of process on
natural persons to the fictitious corporate personality$ was originally limited to suits brought in the state of incorporation.' Practical necessity,
however, made this position untenable in view of the increasing expansion and complexity of corporate activity.5 Consequently, theories of
"implied consent ' 8 and "presence" 7 were propounded, the requirements
'A problem not contemplated within the scope of this note arises where state courts
assert narrower jurisdiction over foreign corporations than that asserted by federal courts
in comparable cases. In that situation, a federal judge would face the problem of a
choice of law in delineating the jurisdiction of his court, which involves the question
of the applicability of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See K. Shapiro,
Inc. v. New York Central R.R., xs F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Mich. 1957).
'See Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915),
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
'Some of the problems in this area have undoubtedly arisen because of a difficulty
in applying jurisdictional ideas developed when the courts dealt only with natural
persons to the idea of a corporate personality. Service of process on a corporation presents different problems than those arising when a natural person is served. Thus, when
the same rules are applied to two situations so different in fact, it is to be expected that
some difficulty will result.
'Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 517, 588 (1839).
5 "This doctrine of the exemption of a corporation from suit in a state other than
that of its creation was the cause of much inconvenience, and often of manifest injustice. The great increase in the number of corporations of late years, and the immense extent of their business, only made this inconvenience and injustice more frequent
and marked" St. Clair v. Cox, xo6 U.S. 350, 355 (iS8).
6 "If a state permits a foreign corporation to do business within her limits, and at
the same time provides that in suits against it for business there done, process shall
be served upon its agents, the provision is to be deemed a condition of the permission;
and corporations that subsequently do business in the state are to be deemed to assent
to such condition as fully as though they had specially authorized their agents to
receive service of the procs." Id. at 356. See also, Insurance Co. v. French, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 404 (855).
"A foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in
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of which are satisfied when it is found that the corporation is "doing
business" in a particular state.8
A further progression was made in InternationalShoe Co. v.State
of Washingtong,where the United States Supreme Court characterized
the "presence" theory as begging the question10 and the "implied consent" theory as a legal fiction 1" and held that due process requires only
certain minimum contacts so that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 12 That
the InternationalShoe case ih has not met with uniform interpretation,
however, is abundantly illustrated by recent decisions, which may be
the absence of consent, only if it is doing business within the state in such manner and
to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present there." Philadelphia &
Reading R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917). See also, Green v. Chicago,
Burlington, and Quincy R.R., 205, U.S. 530 (19o6).
*St. Clair v. Cox, xo6 U.S. 350 (i882); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky,
234 U.S. 579 (1914); Green v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R., 2o U.S. 530
(19o6).
Both of the excerpts quoted in notes 6 and 7, supra, assume that the doing
of business by a corporation satisfies the requirements of the theory in question.
The following portion of the 6pinion in the Green case is an indication of the
factors considered by courts in determining whether a corporation is doing business in
a state: "A single isolated transaction would not usually be sufficient, although the
transaction might be of such magnitude, and involve so many acts as to be an exception
to such a rule. A series of transactions in the state long continued usually amounts
to the carrying on of business, but here again the acts might of of such a character as,
for example, the mere solicitation by traveling salesmen as not to come within the
rule ...certain elements .. .are usually considered to indicate the carrying on of a
business, as e.g.
The establishment of a permanent office to which all persons having business with
the corporation may come.
The employment of an agent located within the state who is advertised as a general
agent of the corporation for such business as it transacts in the state.
The continuous making within the state of contracts binding on the corporation."
2o5 U.S. at 531. See also, Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, z COLUM. L. REV.
io8 (1925); Note, 39 ILL L. REV. 424 (i94.s). A more comprehensive discussion

of the historical development of a state's jurisdiction over foreign corporations can be
found in Comment, 37 CoRNELL L.Q. 458 (195±). See also, Note, 2o TuL. L. REV.
437 6946).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
: "To say that the corporation isso far 'present' there as to satisfy due process requirements . . . is to beg the question to be decided." Id. at 3 16.
" "True, some the decisions holding the corporation amenable to suit have been
supported by resort to the legal fiction that it has given its consent to service and
suit. ....
Id. at 318.
" Id. at 3 16. Another significant part of the opinion states that, "'An estimate
of the inconveniences' which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its
'home' or principal place of business is relevant in this connection." Id. at 317.
"See Comments, x6 U. CHI. L. REv. 523 (1949); ig U. CHI. L. REv. 792
(1951); 37 CoasrEu L.Q. 458 (595z), for analyses of the International Shoe case.

2958]

NOTES

placed into two broad and divergent categories. 14 ErlangerMills, Inc.
v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc.,' is representative of the view that the
"minimum contacts" test is simply a restatement of the conceptualistic
ideas of the past and implies that the question of "presence" is still of
primary importance. On the other hand, there is the view, which has
had some significant judicial acceptance, that the InternationalShoe case
represents a clear departure from the traditional concepts. 6 Under
this approach, interpretation of the "minimum contacts" or "fairness"
test would call for reference to the specific interests in conflict in each
7
particular case.'
"Travelers

Health Ass'n. et al. v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n., 339 U.s.

643 (195o) deals with this problem, but does not dearly indicate what significance
the Supreme Court attaches to International Shoe. The opinion of the Court, which
does not seem to require "presence," was accepted by only four justices, while four,
believing "presence" to be requisite, dissented. Justice Douglas concurred in an opinion
which leaves some doubt as to the significance he attached to Intertzational Shoe.
is 239 F.2d 5o (4th Cir. 1956). Significant language in the Erlanger Mills
case described the "minimum contacts" test as, "not so much an innovation on due
process as it was a rephrasing of the prevailing fictional tests, . . . long employed."
239 F.2d at 506.
is "Both the broad test stated in the InternationalShoe case and its general language
seem dearly to imply that courts may constitutionally exercise greater freedom than they
might have formerly in subjecting foreign corporations to in personam actions."
Comment, z6 U. CHI. L. REV. 523, 525 (949).

The rationale of the International Shoe case was applied in the following cases
to hold that an assertion of jurisdiction over the defendants in question did not violate
due process: Smythe v. Twin State Improvement Corp., So A.2d 664 (Vt. 1951) (defendant's single act in the state was the commission of a tort against the plaintiff);
French v. Gibbs Corp., 189 F.zd 787 (2d Cir. 1951) (defendant had been doing
business in the state until a month before the suit was brought, but when the suit was
brought defendant's activities were not deemed suicient to constitute "doing business");
Latimer v. S/A Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 175 F.ad 384 (2d Cir. 1949) (defendant bought and sold goods in the state only on rare occasions) ; Green v. Equitable
Powder Mfg. Co., 99 F. Supp. 237 (W.D. Ark. 1951) (defendant's employees solicited
business and exhibited products in the state) ; Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co.,
89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 195o) (isolated act of defendant's agent was the basis of a
tort); Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry., 166 F.zd 788 (ad Cir. 1948) (defendant maintained an office with eight employees in the state to solicit passenger and- freight business); Bach v. Friden Calculating Machine Co., 167 F.ad 679 (6th Cir. 1948) (defendant had an employee in the state who sold, serviced, and repaired its products) ;
Rayce v. Chicopee, 148 F. Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (defendant corporation maintained a subsidiary corporation in the state to act as a solicitor of orders which were
accepted or rejected outside the state); W.H. Elliot and Sons Co. v. Nuodex Products
Co., 243 F.zd 116 (ist Cir. 1957) (defendant corporation marketed its products
through another independent corporation, but promoted its product by advertising in
the state and registered its product under the state's Economic Poisons Law).
'For example, the expense and inconvenience of the corporation in defending
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This was the position apparently adopted by the North Carolina
-legislature when it enacted G.S. 55-38.1, liberalizing that state's requirements for service of process on a foreign corporation.' 8 Subsection (a)
(3) of this statute provides for service on a foreign corporation when a
cause of action arises:
out of the production, manufacture; or distribution of goods by
such corporation with the reasonable expectation that those goods
are to be used or consumed, regardless of how or where the
goods were produced, manufactured, marketed, or sold or
whether or not through the medium of independent contractors
or dealers.
This section was declared unconstitutional in Putnam v. Triangle
Publications,9 on the facts of that case,20 as being violative of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. There, the defendant,
a Delaware corporation, with its principal offices in Pennsylvania, published magazines which were. sold to eighteen independent wholesale
newsdealers in North Carolina. Title passed when the magazines were
delivered to the carrier in Pennsylvania, and payments were made at
defendant's Pennsylvania or District of Columbia offices. Three of
defendant's representatives were sent into North Carolina two to five
times a year to promote-sales to television and news dealers. Plaintiff
sued in North Carolina for libel and invasion of privacy as a result of an
article published in one of defendant's magazines, relying upon subsection (a) (3) to support the court's jurisdiction over the defendant.
The court, however, held that the defendant did not have sufficient ties
or contacts with North Carolina to make it amenable to suit in that state.
This result does not comport with the general tenor of decisions in
other forums which'have upheld jurisdiction founded solely upon situs
of contract" or representation in the state by a part-time manufacturer's
the suit would be measured against the convenience of the plaintiff in having a local
forum where his damages could be compensated.
" Some other state statutes dealing with this problem are: ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 99
(Supp. 1953); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-340 (1947); ILL. STAT. ANN. § 104.07
(Jones Supp. 1955) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § S8 ('95i); VT. STAT. § x562 (x947);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3091 (Supp. 1953).
'12 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 0957).
2 245 N.C. at 443, 96 S.,.2d at 454.
2Corbpania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., zoS Md. 237,
07 A.ad 357
(1954).

Jurisdiction here was based on the Maryland statute.

23, § 88 ('g95).

MD. ANN. CODE art.
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agent.2 2 At least one court has adopted a "benefit of the market" test
to uphold jurisdiction over a foreign corporation whose only contact with
the forum was through a dealer who sold and serviced the defendant's
products. 23 And the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held
that important considerations in the jurisdictional problem are the
"convenience of the obligee against the burden of the corporation, 2 1
emphasizing fairness, in the light of the facts of the case,25 rather than
the measurement of the defendant's acts within the state in an effort to
26
determine whether it was "present."
" Nugey v. Paul-Lewis Laboratories,

132

F. Supp. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Perhaps

it is also significant that the manufacturer's respresentative derived only five to ten
percent of his income from selling for the foreign corporation.
"'Eclipse Fuel Engineering Co. v. Superior Court, 307 P.zd 739 (Cal. 1957). The
opinion stated that the distinction between agent and independent contractor was unimportant in deciding the jurisdiction question if "... the representation which petitioner
maintained in the state gave it ...the benefits and advantages it would have enjoyed
by operating through its own office or paid sales force ...." Id. at 742 [citing Sales
Affiliates, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 96 Cal. App.zd 134, 136, 214 P..d 541, 542 (1950)]Note that in the instant case the independent contractor system of selling used by Triangle Publications gave it the benefit of the North Carolina market.
2
'Bonze v. Nardis Sportswear Inc., 165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948). This same
court, speaking through the same judge, has analogized these considerations to those
in the issue of "forum non conveniens."1 Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry., 166 F.2d 788
(2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948). This analogy is criticized in Note,
35 NC.L. REV. 546 (1957). It would appear, however, that since the emphasis is on
convenience and fairness in both situations, the analogy has merit, although it is possible
to make technical distinctions between the two.
" It must not be supposed that the cases in this second group have allowed out-ofstate plaintiffs to sue out-of-state corporations in the courts of a neutral state, or have
allowed residents of a state to sue foreign corporations which had no contacts at all with
the state. The situation is, rather, that of residents of a state suing corporations, which
have certain contacts with the state, for damages which the plaintiff probably suffered
within the confines of the state.
" The Triangle case becomes even more questionable when viewed in light of a
recent United States Supreme Court decision, McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 22o (1957).
There the plaintiff's son had entered into an insurance contract
with an Arizona insurance company whose obligations were subsequently assumed by
defendant, a Texas insurance company. When defendant refused to pay plaintiff's
claim, plaintiff sued and recovered in a California court. Neither the Arizona corporation nor the defendant had ever had any offices or agents in California, and there was
no proof that the defendant had ever solicited or done any insurance business. in
California apart from the policy in question. Jurisdiction was based on a statute which
subjected foreign corporations to suit in California on insurance contracts with residents
of that state.

CAL. INS. CODE §§ 16xo-i62o.

Unable to collect her judgment in California, the plaintiff sued on it in Texas
where enforcement was denied, the Texas court holding it void under the fourteenth
amendment.

McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.. 228 S.W.2d 579 (Tex Civ.
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Thus, it would appear that the Putnam decision is subject to valid
criticism.2 The plaintiff suffered his injury in North Carolina, where
his reputation was harmed by the allegedly libelous article in the defendant's magazine; most of the witnesses would probably have been
from North Carolina; 2" and the law of libel as determined by North
Carolina courts would have been applicable.? Moreover, it is questionable whether a corporation should benefit from a local market and
yet remain immune from suits instituted by persons in the locality who
are damaged by its products. This case indicates that corporations can
tap the North Carolina market without fear of suit by marketing their
products through nominally independent contractors rather than agents.
The end result is that a.corporation, through the careful selection of
marketing methods, and by virtue of this alone, can determine whether
or not it will be amendable to suit in a particular jurisdiction. It seems
anomalous that due process, a concept with roots in fairness and justice,
should bar a suit in the most convenient forum in the absence of inani-

fest unfairness and injustice. to the defendant.
It would appear, therefore, that the effectiveness and utility of the
North Carolina statute, representing as it does an attempt to replace
such fictitional and conceptualistic tests as that of corporate "presence"
with certain specific rules which are more compatible with the complexities of a modem economy, has been unnecessarily curtailed. Under
the authority of the International Shoe case, the court would have
been justified in holding it constitutional on the facts of the Putnam
App. 1956). In reversing, the United States Supreme Court found what it considered
a dearly discernible trend toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction
over foreign corporations and other non-residents. This trend was explained as
partially the result of the increasing nationalization of commerce and the improvements
in transportation and communication which- make it easier for a party sued to defend
himself where he engages in economic 'activity. The court also mentioned the availability of witnesses and the disadvantage to residents in having to follow an insurance
company to a distant state in order to hold it legally accountable as being pertinent

factors in determining whether due process was satisfied.
7But cf. Note, 35 N.C.L. Raz 546 (1957) viewing this decision with favor.
" For example, the plaintiff must prove the lowering of his esteem in the eyes of
a substantial group in order to establish a case of libel. This element of the tort of
libel is satisfied usually ... .- ifhe is lowered in the esteem of any substantial and
respectable grop...
." PROSSE, ToPTs § 92, p. 577 (2d ed. x955)., Beizig a resident of North Carolina, plaintiff's reputation must have been lowered in the eyes of
fellow North- Carolina residents. Their testimony would have to be used to establish
this element of plaintiff's case. ;
"FRsTATEMENT,

CoNFLIcr op LAWsi

§§

377, 378 (1934).
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case. 0 Nor does the judicial spectre of a myriad of small suits brought
to harass a corporation engaged in multistate activity appear other than
chimerical when it is realized that such suits may be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction under the "minimum contacts" or "fairness" test.81
Furthermore, there is no well-founded reason why a corporation should
not have to defend in the forum where it has caused injury, regardless
of the number of suits which might result.
Mature reflection upon the object of the more liberal approach to
this problem, as illustrated by the decisions of other courts and by the
policy factors which impelled the enactment of the statute in question,
makes manifest the need for a reappraisal of subsection (a) (3)0

" Admittedly, there are certain fact situations where an application of subsection
(a) (3) would be unconstitutional. An example, perhaps, is the hypothetical case posed
by Judge Sobeloff in Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes, 239 F.ad 502 (4 th Cir. 1956). In
his example, a service station in Califoria sells a tire to a car with a Pennsylvania
license plate. The seller could be expected to anticipate the use of the tire in Pennsylvania, but one would hesitate to argue that he should have to defend a suit in Pennsylvariia if the tire were defective. Here, the considerations of convenience and fairness
would be on the side of the seller, who has only a modicum of contact with Pennsylvania.
' The old "presence" theory does not seem to offer any greater degree of protection
against these so called "nuisance suits" than the "'minlmum contracts" of "fairness"
test. Even under the "presence" test the 6orporation's attorney is taking a chance if he
refuses to go to a state and defend against a suit because he believes the state has no
jurisdiction over his client. The law on this point is not so dear that the attorney can
easily tell whether a state really has jurisdiction over his client or not. The real difference in the two approaches to the problem is that the attorney's considerations are, at
least, partially conceptual under the "presence" test, while under the "minimum contacts" test the attorney is primarily concerned with the factors of convenience and fairness to all parties involved.

